Flannagan v Milne

Flannagan, the licensee of the Imperial Hotel, sought to have his rent adjusted under the Licensing Acts Further Amendment Act (No. 2) 1915 (SA). He had given a notice to Milne, his lessor, which the Supreme Court of South Australia found to be insufficient under section 72 of the Act. The Supreme Court had allowed Milne's appeal from a decision of a Stipendiary Magistrate who had found the notice sufficient and had allowed the application for rent adjustment. Flannagan appealed this decision to the High Court of Australia.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the notice provided by Flannagan to Milne was a sufficient notice in writing as required by section 72 of the Licensing Acts Further Amendment Act (No. 2) 1915, and if not, whether Milne had waived any objection to its insufficiency. Section 72 permitted a lessee to give notice to the owner of licensed premises if, by reason of pecuniary loss consequent on the operation of the 1915 Act, the lessee desired an adjustment of rent. Section 73 outlined the procedure for applying to the President of the Industrial Court if no agreement was reached.

The High Court held that the notice given by Flannagan, stating "Under secs. 72, 73 and others of the Licensing Acts Further Amendment Act (No. 2) 1915 I hereby apply to have the rent of the Imperial Hotel reduced," was a sufficient notice. The Court reasoned that the Act did not prescribe a strict form for the notice and that substantial compliance was sufficient. The reference to the relevant sections, coupled with the clear intent to seek a rent reduction, made it a necessary inference that the application was due to pecuniary loss consequent on the Act. Furthermore, the Court found that even if the notice had been technically insufficient, Milne had waived any objection. This conclusion was based on Milne's conduct, including his subsequent application under section 76 of the Act which referenced Flannagan's original notice, and his delay in raising objections for over two years, demonstrating an acceptance of the notice's sufficiency. The appeal was allowed, the Supreme Court's order was discharged, and the Stipendiary Magistrate's order was restored.