Findex Group Pty Ltd v McKay

The Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory considered an application for leave to appeal by Findex Group Ltd and related entities (collectively, Findex) against an interlocutory decision of the primary judge. The dispute arose from Findex's attempt to reopen an earlier decision that refused their application to file a Further Amended Statement of Claim. The respondent, David McKay, a former employee, alleged that Findex had sent disparaging correspondence to clients.

The legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether leave to appeal should be granted, and if so, whether the primary judge erred in dismissing Findex's application to reopen the earlier decision. Findex contended that they were denied procedural fairness in the handling of the reopening application and that the primary judge made factual errors in her decision, citing grounds that would constitute a substantial injustice.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, acknowledging the reluctance to interfere with interlocutory decisions but finding that the alleged denial of procedural fairness and potential factual errors could occasion substantial injustice. The Court reasoned that the primary judge may have proceeded on a misapprehension of the facts and that the appeal raised arguable points regarding procedural fairness.

The Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for further determination on whether Findex should be permitted to reopen the earlier decision.