Figliuzzi v Yonan

The appeal concerned a decision of Judge O'Toole in the District Court of New South Wales, which granted the respondent leave to commence proceedings out of time under the *Motor Accidents Act 1988* (NSW). The appellant sought leave to appeal this decision, arguing that the primary judge erred in granting leave. The respondent had suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident while travelling to work and had subsequently lodged a workers' compensation claim. She was employed by the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales and had some familiarity with the legal profession through her work.

The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the respondent had provided a "full and satisfactory explanation" for her delay in commencing proceedings under the *Motor Accidents Act 1988*, as required by section 40(2) of the Act. This involved determining whether a reasonable person in the respondent's position would have experienced a similar delay, and whether the appellant would suffer prejudice as a result of the delay. The Court also considered whether the primary judge's decision involved an appealable error, particularly in relation to the duty to provide reasons for a discretionary decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the primary judge's order. The majority found that while the respondent's ignorance of the law did not automatically excuse her delay, her circumstances, including her belief that her workers' compensation claim was her sole avenue for redress and the lack of information from her employer to the contrary, could constitute a full and satisfactory explanation. The Court applied the "reasonable person" test, considering whether such a person, in the respondent's position and with her background, would have been justified in experiencing the same delay. The Court concluded that the primary judge's decision was not demonstrably wrong, and therefore, the appeal was allowed.

The orders made were that the appeal be allowed, the orders of Judge O'Toole be set aside, and the respondent's application for leave to commence proceedings be dismissed. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs in the District Court and on appeal, with a certificate under the *Suitors’ Fund Act 1951* available if otherwise qualified.