Ferris v Queensland Building and Construction Commission

This matter concerned an application before Judge Jarrett in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The applicant, Ferris, sought to rely on a decision of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) for the purposes of bankruptcy proceedings. The central dispute revolved around whether a final decision of QCAT constituted a "judgment" or "order" for the purposes of sections 40(1)(g) and 41 of the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth).

The court was required to determine whether a final decision of QCAT was a judgment or order of a judicial body for the purposes of the *Bankruptcy Act*. This question arose in circumstances where the parties had focused on section 131 of the *Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009* (Qld), which provides a mechanism for enforcing monetary decisions of QCAT by filing them in a court of competent jurisdiction. However, the court considered this procedural aspect to be a distraction from the more fundamental issue of QCAT's status.

Judge Jarrett reasoned that QCAT, despite its name, is a court. This conclusion was supported by section 164(1) of the *QCAT Act*, which designates QCAT as a "court of record". The court referred to *Owen v Menzies* [2013] 2 Qd R 327, where the Queensland Court of Appeal held that QCAT is a State court capable of exercising federal power. The Court of Appeal identified several characteristics of QCAT supporting this view, including its status as a court of record, its function of making binding decisions on controversies, its implied obligation to decide according to parties' rights, and its requirement to act independently. The court also noted that the inability of QCAT to enforce its own decisions did not preclude it from being considered a court. Furthermore, in *Medical Board of Australia v Judge Horneman-Wren & Leggett* [2013] QSC 339, Dalton J recognised the judicial character of QCAT decisions.

Consequently, Judge Jarrett concluded that a final decision of QCAT is a judgment or order for the purposes of sections 40(1)(g) and 41 of the *Bankruptcy Act*. The court did not need to determine whether it was specifically a judgment or an order, only that it met the threshold requirement.