Fennessy & Sanchez

The appeal concerned a father's applications to the Family Court of Australia for the disqualification of the trial judge and for an interlocutory order regarding contact with a child. The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia heard the appeal.

The legal issues before the Full Court were whether the trial judge erred in refusing to disqualify himself from hearing the substantive proceedings, and whether the trial judge erred in refusing to grant an interlocutory order concerning contact with the child. Specifically, the father asserted that the trial judge failed to consider and apply the principles from *Goode and Goode* (2006) FLC 93-286, that the judge's reasons for judgment were inadequate, and that the judge's exercise of discretion was flawed. The father also contended that the trial judge should have disqualified himself due to the implications of delay, and for other reasons including alleged prejudice, lack of impartiality, actual bias, contempt of court orders, corruption of the court process, denial of the child's best interests, and denial of procedural justice.

The Full Court found that the assertion that the trial judge erred in failing to consider and apply the principles of *Goode and Goode* was not established. The Court was not satisfied that the trial judge was obliged in the circumstances to refer to the matters discussed in *Goode* in his reasons, finding the judge's reasons adequate and his course of reasoning not to constitute appealable error. The Court also held that the assertion that the trial judge ought to have disqualified himself due to the implications of delay was not established, adopting the principles from *R v Maxwell* (1998) 217 ALR 452 and finding no evidence of anything said or done by the judge that could give rise to a reasonable apprehension of a lack of impartiality. Furthermore, the Court found that it was not established that the trial judge should have disqualified himself for other alleged reasons, including prejudice, impartiality, bias, contempt, corruption, or denial of the child's best interests or procedural justice. The Full Court concluded that even if the trial judge had erred in relation to *Goode* factors, the adequacy of reasons, or the exercise of discretion, it was not able to re-exercise the discretion, and a remitter for a re-hearing of the interim application was inappropriate given that judgment in the substantive proceedings had been reserved.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.