Federated Sawmill, Timberyard and General Woodworkers' Employees' Association (Adelaide Branch) v Alexander

The Federated Sawmill, Timberyard and General Woodworkers' Employees' Association (Adelaide Branch) brought a complaint against John James Alexander to recover levies and dues allegedly owed by him. The matter was heard by a Special Magistrate of South Australia exercising federal jurisdiction. The Association was registered under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, and the dispute concerned whether Mr. Alexander remained a member and liable for payments after giving notice of his intention to discontinue membership.

The legal issues before the High Court were twofold. Firstly, whether the jurisdiction conferred by section 68 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1910 was subject to the time limitation imposed by section 10 of the Justices Act 1850 (S.A.), which required complaints to be made within six months of the matter arising. Secondly, the Court had to determine the interpretation of the Association's rules regarding the cessation of membership, specifically whether a member remained liable for levies and dues after giving the requisite notice if they had not paid all outstanding amounts at the expiration of that notice period.

The Court reasoned that when a federal statute confers jurisdiction on a State Court, that Court is taken as it is found, with its existing limitations, unless expressly stated otherwise. Section 39(2) of the Judiciary Act 1903 was interpreted to mean that State laws regarding the jurisdiction of State Courts would prevail in all respects other than subject matter. Therefore, the time limitation in section 10 of the Justices Act 1850 applied to proceedings brought under section 68 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act. Regarding the rules, the Court held that the phrase "without paying" in the context of discontinuing membership should be read as "without remaining liable to pay." This interpretation was adopted to avoid manifest injustice, meaning a member who gave the required three months' notice would cease to be liable for levies and dues accruing after the expiration of that notice period, even if some amounts were still outstanding at that time.

The appeal was dismissed. The Special Magistrate's decision that the Association had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint for levies and dues that became payable more than six months before the complaint was laid was affirmed. Furthermore, Mr. Alexander was found not to be liable for levies and dues made by the Association after the expiration of three months from the date he gave written notice of his intention to discontinue his membership.