Fares v The King

The appellant, Fares, appealed against his conviction and sentence following a trial in the Supreme Court of Victoria. He was found guilty of two charges of murder, two charges of attempted murder, and one charge of intentionally causing serious injury. The appeal centred on two primary issues: the admissibility of tendency evidence during the trial and the appropriateness of the sentence imposed. The Court of Appeal considered whether the prosecution's use of character evidence invited the jury to engage in impermissible reasoning about the appellant's propensity to commit the crimes. Additionally, the appeal examined whether the trial judge erred in declining to direct the jury not to use the evidence as tendency evidence and if a substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred. The Court of Appeal also reviewed the sentence, questioning whether the trial judge failed to consider the appellant's youth and maturity as mitigating factors and if the judge had engaged in a two-stage sentencing process.

The court delved into the principles set forth in the Evidence Act 2008, specifically section 97, and examined the implications of the prosecution's reliance on character evidence in cross-examination and the final address. It referenced the High Court's decision in Awad v The Queen, which highlighted the risks of improper use of tendency evidence. The court further considered Baini v The Queen, which provided guidance on the proper use of character evidence in criminal trials. The appeal also referenced relevant sections of the Sentencing Act 1991 and the Crimes Act 1958 to assess the appropriateness of the sentence imposed. The court distinguished DPP v Pan, and considered Azzopardi v The Queen, Brown v The Queen, DPP v Dalgliesh, and R v Kilic to determine whether the trial judge had properly applied the standard sentencing provisions.

The Court of Appeal found that the prosecution's use of character evidence did not invite the jury to engage in impermissible tendency reasoning. The court held that the trial judge's decision to not direct the jury against using the evidence as tendency evidence did not result in a substantial miscarriage of justice. Regarding the sentence, the court determined that the trial judge had appropriately considered the appellant's age and maturity as mitigating factors and had not engaged in a two-stage sentencing process. The court found that the sentence, life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 27 years, was not manifestly excessive given the gravity of the offences. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.