Executive Director of Health v Lily Creek International Pty Ltd

The case before the court involved an appeal by the Executive Director of Health against the granting of an unrestricted hotel licence to Lily Creek International Pty Ltd in Kununurra. The Director of Health had intervened under section 69(8a) of the Liquor Licensing Act 1988, challenging the decision on the basis that the licence would cause harm or ill health to a group of people in the community. The judge had ruled that the evidence of harm was only relevant if such harm was proved to stem from the grant of a licence on the balance of probabilities. The Director of Health argued that the judge misconstrued the Act and erred in rejecting the expert evidence presented by the appellant.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the judge had misconstrued the Liquor Licensing Act 1988 by concluding that evidence of harm or ill health was only relevant if such harm was proved to stem from the grant of a licence, and whether the judge had erred in rejecting the expert evidence presented by the appellant. The court also had to consider the importance and interrelation of the objects stated in section 5 of the Act, the admissibility and weight of expert evidence, and the relationship between availability of liquor and levels of community consumption of alcohol.

The court held that the judge had misconstrued the Act by requiring proof of harm or ill health stemming from the grant of a licence before considering the evidence. The court found that the evidence was relevant according to the usual considerations as to weight, and that an inference drawn from past facts is not mere conjecture. The court also found that the judge had erred in rejecting the expert evidence presented by the appellant, as the relationship between availability of liquor and levels of community consumption of alcohol was not within the ordinary knowledge of the court. The court held that the expert opinions of the appellant's witnesses were not "mere conjecture, guesswork or surmise" and that the principles governing admissibility of expert evidence were distinct from the appropriate weight to be given to such evidence.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the Licensing Magistrate, and remitted the matter to the Licensing Magistrate for reconsideration. The court held that the evidence on the ultimate issue was relevant according to the usual considerations as to weight, and that the expert opinions of the appellant's witnesses were not "mere conjecture, guesswork or surmise". The court also held that the relationship between availability of liquor and levels of community consumption of alcohol was not within the ordinary knowledge of the court.