Evidence (Amendment) Act (No 2) 1985 (ACT)

This case involved the application of the Evidence (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 2) 1985 (ACT), which made significant changes to the Evidence Ordinance 1971. The key issues before the court were whether the provisions of the Ordinance, particularly those relating to sexual offence proceedings, were consistent with the law of evidence and whether they adequately protected the rights of the accused and the complainant. The Ordinance aimed to reform the admissibility of evidence in sexual offence proceedings, including the abolition of certain rules of evidence and the introduction of new rules to protect the complainant's identity and reputation.

The court found that the Ordinance was consistent with the law of evidence and did not unjustifiably infringe upon the rights of the accused or the complainant. The court emphasised that the reforms were designed to protect the vulnerable complainants of sexual offences and to ensure that their evidence could be given in a manner that minimised trauma and preserved their privacy. The court held that the new rules, such as the prohibition on evidence of the complainant's sexual reputation and experience, and the requirement for evidence to be given in camera, were necessary and appropriate to achieve these objectives.

The court also noted that the Ordinance did not unfairly prejudice the accused by abolishing the requirement for corroboration of the complainant's evidence. The court found that the judge's discretion to comment on the reliability of evidence, and the right to warn the jury about the dangers of convicting on uncorroborated evidence, were sufficient to protect the accused's rights. The court held that the new rules were not inconsistent with the principles of natural justice or the right to a fair trial.

The court concluded that the Evidence (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 2) 1985 (ACT) was valid and did not infringe upon the rights of the accused or the complainant. The court upheld the constitutionality of the Ordinance and found that it was a reasonable and necessary reform of the law of evidence in sexual offence proceedings.