Edwards v Virgin Blue International Pty Ltd

In *Edwards v Virgin Blue International Pty Ltd*, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia considered an appeal from a magistrate's decision summarily dismissing the appellant's claim for damages for pure mental harm. The appellant alleged she suffered this injury as a result of being informed of her son's death, which occurred in Thailand during his employment with the respondent. The appellant had separately received compensation for her son's death under New South Wales workers' compensation legislation. The respondent successfully sought summary dismissal of the appellant's damages claim, arguing it was barred by section 151AD of the *Workers Compensation Act 1987* (NSW), a provision the magistrate found applicable by virtue of section 58AA of the *Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986* (SA).

The central legal issue before the Full Court was the proper construction and application of section 58AA of the South Australian Act. Specifically, the court had to determine whether this provision mandated that the substantive law of New South Wales governed the appellant's claim for damages for pure mental harm, thereby rendering it statute-barred under section 151AD of the NSW Act. This involved considering whether the appellant's claim was a claim for damages "in respect of the injury" to the worker, as contemplated by section 58AA.

The Full Court, allowing the appeal, held that section 58AA did not apply to the appellant's claim. The court reasoned that the operation of section 58AA is confined to claims for damages in respect of an injury *to the worker* or the death *of the worker*. The appellant's claim was for damages for an injury she personally suffered (nervous shock), not for the injury or death of her son. The court drew an analogy with the High Court's decision in *The Workers’ Compensation Board of Queensland v Technical Products Pty Ltd*, which held that damages for nervous shock suffered by a worker's wife were not "damages in respect of that injury" to the worker, as a separate injury was interposed. Therefore, the substantive law of New South Wales did not govern the appellant's claim by operation of section 58AA.

Consequently, the Full Court set aside the magistrate's order dismissing the action and entering judgment for the respondent. The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted for further proceedings.