Dunn v The Queen; Jones v The Queen

Phillip Francis Jones and another party, Dunn, sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia. The applications concerned questions relating to the conduct of a fair trial, specifically the tests applicable to ensuring a fair trial when an application for the discharge of a jury is made.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether a reference by a police witness to having knowledge of an accused, in circumstances obviously adverse to that accused, was sufficient to justify a requirement that the trial judge discharge the jury. This involved considering the exercise of judicial discretion in such matters and whether the wrongful admission of evidence could lead to the view that the jury might not have returned the same verdicts.

The applicants submitted that the approach to this question should be that articulated by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in *R v Knape*. This approach suggests that unless it can be said, upon the evidence, that the irregular disclosure could not in any way affect the judgment of the jury, the trial judge should exercise their discretion in favour of the accused. While conceding that the matter is one of discretion and not a strict rule of law, the applicants argued for the adoption of this particular approach to the exercise of that discretion.