Dunlop Rubber Australia Ltd v Buckley

This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appeal concerned an action for damages brought by Daniel Thomas Buckley (the plaintiff) against Dunlop Rubber Australia Ltd. (the defendant) for injuries sustained while operating a rubber rolling machine. Buckley alleged that the machine was dangerous and that the defendant had breached its statutory duty under section 33 of the *Factories and Shops Act 1912-1950* (N.S.W.) by failing to securely fence it. A jury had returned a verdict for the defendant, but the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales set aside this verdict and ordered a new trial.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the jury's verdict for the defendant was so unreasonable as to be perverse, and whether the Supreme Court of New South Wales was correct in finding that the jury could not reasonably conclude that the rubber rolling machine was not dangerous. Specifically, the court had to consider the meaning of "dangerous" and "securely fence" within the context of section 33 of the Act, and whether the provision of a stop cord constituted adequate protection or an admission of danger.

A majority of the High Court (Webb, Fullagar, and Kitto JJ.) held that the jury's verdict was not so unreasonable as to be "almost perverse" and that the jury had not failed in their duty. They reasoned that the question of whether a machine is dangerous is a question of fact and degree, and while the evidence of previous accidents and the nature of the machine suggested danger, it was open to the jury to consider these factors alongside the presence of the stop cord. The majority distinguished the present case from others where a finding of danger was considered inevitable, emphasizing that the jury was entitled to weigh all the evidence.

The appeal was allowed, and the order of the Supreme Court of New South Wales for a new trial was set aside. The defendant was therefore entitled to retain its verdict. Dixon C.J. and McTiernan J. dissented, finding that the verdict was indeed unreasonable given the evidence.