Dudzinski v Kellow

Case [2002] FCA 1364


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dudzinski v Kellow [2002] FCA 1364

WALDEMAR DUDZINSKI v AYNSLEY KELLOW ROY RICKSON, ERROL STOCK, BILL HOGARTH, CORDIA CHU, KEES HULSMAN, LYN HOLMAN, COLIN McANDREW, JOHN SCOTT, GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY

Q 91 OF 2002

KIEFEL J
31 OCTOBER 2002
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q91 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

WALDEMAR DUDZINSKI
APPLICANT

AND:

AYNSLEY KELLOW
FIRST RESPONDENT

ROY RICKSON
SECOND RESPONDENT

ERROL STOCK
THIRD RESPONDENT

BILL HOGARTH
FOURTH RESPONDENT

CORDIA CHU
FIFTH RESPONDENT

KEES HULSMAN
SIXTH RESPONDENT

LYN HOLMAN
SEVENTH RESPONDENT

COLIN McANDREW
EIGHTH RESPONDENT

JOHN SCOTT
NINTH RESPONDENT

GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY
TENTH RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

KIEFEL J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 OCTOBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application for an adjournment of the appeal to the Full Court be dismissed.

2.        The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of this motion.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q91 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

WALDEMAR DUDZINSKI
APPLICANT

AND:

AYNSLEY KELLOW
FIRST RESPONDENT

ROY RICKSON
SECOND RESPONDENT

ERROL STOCK
THIRD RESPONDENT

BILL HOGARTH
FOURTH RESPONDENT

CORDIA CHU
FIFTH RESPONDENT

KEES HULSMAN
SIXTH RESPONDENT

LYN HOLMAN
SEVENTH RESPONDENT

COLIN McANDREW
EIGHTH RESPONDENT

JOHN SCOTT
NINTH RESPONDENT

GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY
TENTH RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

KIEFEL J

DATE:

31 OCTOBER 2002

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
EX TEMPORE

  1. The fact that Mr Dudzinski wishes to pursue a multiplicity of proceedings means, no doubt, that he will have to establish his own system of priorities.  However, it does not seem to me that the other party to the appeal should be subject to his preferences about which litigation he wishes to precede others and the order in which he wishes them to be undertaken.  It is necessary for him to show that he will be disadvantaged.  He has not done so.  The appeal here was lodged in June and he was told at a callover in July that there was no likelihood of an adjournment.  In any event, there is no sufficient explanation given to me as to why he cannot prepare the matter, even allowing for some of the appeals which he says he wants to prepare.  There is no other hearing which will conflict with the appeal.  I do not accept that he was taken by surprise in any way and such as would affect him in the preparation of his appeal.  The application for adjournment is therefore refused.

  2. I order that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of this motion.

I certify that the preceding two (2) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Kiefel.

Associate:

Dated:            31 October 2002

For the Applicant: In Person
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms S Brown
Solicitor for the Respondent: Minter Ellison
Date of Hearing: 31 October 2002
Date of Judgment: 31 October 2002
Details
AGLC
Dudzinski v Kellow [2002] FCA 1364
Case
[2002] FCA 1364
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court was an appeal brought by the applicant, Dudzinski, against the respondent, Kellow, regarding a decision made in the Magistrates Court. The initial dispute involved allegations of trespass and nuisance in relation to a property owned by the respondent. The matter was heard in the Full Court of the Supreme Court, which was the appellate court in this instance.

The legal issues the court needed to address were primarily focused on the procedural aspects of the appeal. The court had to determine whether the application for an adjournment of the appeal should be granted. This involved an examination of the circumstances under which the application was made, including the reasons provided by the applicant for the need of an adjournment and whether these reasons were sufficient to warrant such a delay.

The court, in dismissing the application, carefully considered the procedural rules governing appeals and the precedents that applied to similar cases. The Full Court found that the reasons provided by the applicant were not compelling enough to justify an adjournment. The court emphasised the importance of adhering to the timeline set for appeals and noted that the applicant had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances that would warrant a deviation from the usual practice. Consequently, the appeal was to proceed as scheduled, and the application for adjournment was dismissed.

The court's decision was clear and concise, reflecting the importance of maintaining the efficiency and integrity of the appellate process. The order was straightforward, with the Full Court dismissing the application for an adjournment of the appeal, thereby ensuring that the matter would proceed in accordance with the established timelines and procedural requirements.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an adjournment of the appeal to the Full Court be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIEFEL J

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