| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted | |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
No. 1464 of 2001
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| BOHDAN WEISS |
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Ruling No. 3 (2nd Trial)
JUDGE: | Cummins J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF RULING: | 14 March 2002 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Bohdan Weiss | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2002] VSC 155 | |
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Criminal law and procedure – murder – jury – oppression upon juror – discharge of jury – s. 43(d) Juries Act 2000.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the DPP | Mr P. Faris QC | OPP |
| For the Accused | Mr C. Lovitt QC | Victoria Legal Aid |
HIS HONOUR:
A problem has arisen in this case namely that one member of the jury - who plainly should have applied for excuse, and had he applied it would have been granted - did not apply for excuse but has now informed the Juries Commissioner of significant personal difficulty in serving for a month in this trial. The juror is an unemployed plumber who is about, he believes, to get work and was certainly actively seeking work. In the circumstances I would have excused him had he applied as a member of the panel.
I would discharge him pursuant to s.43(d) Juries Act 2000 and proceed with 11 jurors if that was an appropriate way to proceed. However, Mr Lovitt, senior counsel for the accused, has received instructions from his client, which instructions I entirely understand, that his client wishes to proceed with a full panel of 12 jurors. The Crown, indeed, does not demur from that position.
The trial has not yet received evidence and we are simply at the stage of the prosecution opening and, in all the circumstances, I consider that it is fair and proper that the normal constitutional fulfilment of 12 jurors be achieved, particularly as that is the wish of the accused. For that reason I will discharge this jury and proceed later this morning with a new panel and a new arraignment.
I will bring the jury in and discharge it.
Bring the jury in.
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- AGLC
- Director of Public Prosecutions v Weiss [2002] VSC 155
- Case
- [2002] VSC 155
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this case was whether the trial judge should have discharged the jury under section 43(d) of the Juries Act 2000, which allows for the discharge of a jury when there has been oppression upon any juror. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge should have discharged the jury, finding that the juror's oppressive conduct had created a substantial risk that the trial was not fair. The Director of Public Prosecutions argued that the Court of Appeal had erred in its interpretation of the term "oppression" and that the trial judge had not erred in declining to discharge the jury.
In determining the matter, the High Court considered the meaning of "oppression" within the context of section 43(d) of the Juries Act 2000. The Court held that "oppression" should be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning and that the trial judge had not erred in declining to discharge the jury. The Court found that the oppressive conduct did not create a substantial risk that the trial was not fair, and that the trial judge had been correct in allowing the trial to continue. The Court of Appeal's decision was thus overturned, and the original conviction was reinstated.
The High Court did not make any further orders in relation to the matter, and the respondent’s appeal against conviction was dismissed. The original conviction and sentence stood, and the respondent remained imprisoned. The Court’s decision clarified the meaning of "oppression" within the context of section 43(d) of the Juries Act 2000 and provided guidance to trial judges in determining whether to discharge a jury in cases of oppressive conduct.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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