| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
CRIMINAL DIVISION
No. 1460 of 2007
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| THOMAS GRAHAM TOWLE |
Ruling No. 10
JUDGE: | CUMMINS J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF RULING: | 5 March 2008 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Towle (Ruling No 10) | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2008] VSC 264 | |
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Criminal law and procedure – culpable driving – issue arising on evidence.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Director of Public Prosecutions | Mr M Gamble SC with Ms A Forrester | Office of Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr R Richter QC with Ms K Blair | Victorian Aboriginal Legal Service |
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Ruling No. 10
HIS HONOUR:
I am entirely unpersuaded I should make any comment to the jury one way or the other. I do not propose to argue Mr Richter's case and I do not propose to argue Mr Gamble's case.
The evidence is there loud and clear; it could not be clearer; it was always there. If counsel now are concerned about it, that is simply a forensic fact which happens in lots of trials. I am not going to hide the evidence from the jury. Nor am I going to make comments about the evidence.
As to the legal point by Mr Richter that I have reversed the onus of proof, that is a misconception of the forensic function. There is no onus of proof on the accused. I have not reversed it. There is an onus on counsel to put issues which are going to be litigated to the jury. Mr Richter went to the jury saying there was no evidence that anyone was in front of the Poulton vehicle. Two weeks earlier Mr Poulton said it twice in the most unequivocal terms and was not challenged. That is a fact of forensic life; it is not a legal reversal of the onus of proof.
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- AGLC
- Director of Public Prosecutions v Towle (Ruling no 10) [2008] VSC 264
- Case
- [2008] VSC 264
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal considered whether intoxication could ever be a relevant consideration in a charge of dangerous driving. The Court held that intoxication was not an essential element of the offence of dangerous driving, but could be relevant in determining whether the defendant had the capacity to drive safely. The Court noted that intoxication could be relevant if it was so severe that it impaired the defendant's ability to drive safely, but in this case, the Court found that the defendant's level of intoxication did not rise to that level. The Court also noted that the fact that the defendant was intoxicated did not necessarily mean that he was incapable of driving safely.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the magistrate's ruling that the defendant's intoxication was not a relevant consideration in determining whether he was guilty of the offence of dangerous driving. The Court held that the defendant's level of intoxication did not impair his ability to drive safely, and therefore, the magistrate was correct to exclude evidence of the defendant's intoxication from consideration in determining his culpability. The Court also noted that the defendant's level of intoxication did not necessarily mean that he was incapable of driving safely, and that other factors, such as his speed and the condition of the road, were more relevant in determining whether he was guilty of the offence of dangerous driving.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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