Dixon-Jenkins v Director of Public Prosecutions

John Charles Dixon-Jenkins applied to the High Court of Australia for special leave to appeal against his conviction. The Director of Public Prosecutions was the respondent. The central dispute concerned the trial judge's ruling that the defence of necessity could not be considered by the jury, a decision subsequently upheld by the Court of Criminal Appeal. The application was made significantly out of time.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the defence of necessity was available to the applicant in the circumstances of the case. This involved determining whether the criminal acts alleged against the applicant could, as a matter of law, be considered as a means to avert an imminent peril, and whether the defence of necessity was applicable to the charges laid under sections 198 and 35B of the Victorian Crimes Act 1958.

The trial judge had ruled that the defence of necessity was not available because the criminal acts, if proven, could not remove the alleged imminent peril, which was described as the threat of wholesale destruction from the use of the [unspecified]. The applicant argued that both the trial judge and the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in withdrawing this defence from the jury. The High Court was therefore required to consider the legal principles governing the defence of necessity, particularly in relation to the proportionality between the criminal act and the peril sought to be avoided.