Director of Public Prosecutions Reference No 1 of 2017

This matter came before the High Court of Australia as a reference from the Director of Public Prosecutions of Victoria concerning the legality of a specific jury direction. The dispute arose from a murder trial where the trial judge, over the objection of the defence, gave a direction to the jury, commonly known as a "Prasad direction," at the close of the Crown case and again at the close of the defence case. The trial ultimately resulted in verdicts of not guilty of murder and not guilty of manslaughter.

The High Court was required to determine two principal legal issues. Firstly, whether the "Prasad direction" was contrary to law and therefore should not be administered to a jury in a criminal trial. Secondly, the Court considered whether a ballot conducted to reduce the jury from 13 to 12 members, after one juror had been temporarily removed to consider a response to the "Prasad direction," occurred at a time when the jury was "required to retire to consider its verdict."

The Court reasoned that the "Prasad direction" was fundamentally flawed as it invited the jury to effectively stop the case, a power that does not reside with the jury. Such a direction undermined the established procedure for a "no case" submission, which is a matter for the judge alone. The Court held that the practice of inviting the jury to stop the case was contrary to law and incompatible with the concept of a fair trial, as it could create an impression of a jury's suggested right to stop the case, thereby prejudicing the prosecution. Regarding the second issue, the Court found that the ballot occurred at a time when the jury had not yet retired to consider its verdict, and therefore the procedure was not unlawful on that ground.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. In lieu thereof, the High Court answered the point of law by stating that the "Prasad direction" is contrary to law and should not be administered to a jury determining a criminal trial. The Director of Public Prosecutions was ordered to pay the reasonable costs of the acquitted person.