Dimitriou v Curtis

Case [2013] FCA 198


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dimitriou v Curtis

[2013] FCA 198

Citation: Dimitriou v Curtis [2013] FCA 198
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Paul Anthony Curtis v Georgina Dimitriou [2012] FCA 604
Parties: GEORGINA DIMITRIOU v PAUL ANTHONY CURTIS
File number: NSD 1643 of 2012
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 1 February 2013
Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 4.12, 4.14, 4.15, 4.17(b)
Cases cited:

Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225

Dimitriou v Curtis [2012] FCA 1347

Date of hearing: 1 February 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 5
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D English
Solicitor for the Respondent: Colin Biggers & Paisley

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1643 of 2012

BETWEEN:

GEORGINA DIMITRIOU
Applicant

AND:

PAUL ANTHONY CURTIS
Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 FEBRUARY 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.  

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1643 of 2012

BETWEEN:

GEORGINA DIMITRIOU
Applicant

AND:

PAUL ANTHONY CURTIS
Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE:

1 FEBRUARY 2013

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

  1. On 16 November 2012, I considered that there may be one matter which might not have been addressed by the primary judge, that I identified in the course of my reasons:   Dimitriou v Curtis [2012] FCA 1347 at [8]. I ordered that Ms Dimitriou be referred to a lawyer for legal assistance in accordance with r 4.12 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) for the purpose of advising her whether she had an arguable case on appeal, specifically on the issue of whether, at the time of the making of the sequestration order on the evidence before the primary judge, she was solvent, and for the purpose of preparing and allowing her to file and serve an affidavit as to the material before the primary judge on that issue attaching the proposed notice of appeal. I directed that such an affidavit be filed and served on or before 14 December 2012 and stood the matter over until 21 December 2012.

  2. No such affidavit was filed in accordance with those directions on or before 14 December 2012 or has been to date.  On 21 December 2012, I stood the proceedings over to today.  Ms Dimitriou has filed an affidavit today that sets out in a great deal of detail conversations she said that she had with the barrister who accepted the referral which I have not read by reason of the same potentially being privileged and possibly prejudicing her.   However, the affidavit identified that she received preliminary advice from the barrister on 6 December 2012 and subsequently she then began communicating with the barrister by telephone seeking to give further material to him.

  3. In the circumstances, the barrister has not sought to be excused under r 4.15 from providing legal assistance. I infer that he provided that legal assistance in accordance with the referral certificate under r 4.14, and by reason of r 4.17(b), I infer that he provided the legal assistance mentioned in the referral certificate and that the referral has now ceased to have effect.

  4. In the intervening period between 6 December 2012 and today, Ms Dimitriou has not filed any material going to the substantive issue the subject of the referral.  Accordingly, I am of opinion that there is no basis for considering the viability, as a possible point of appeal, of the possibility which I raised in my earlier reasons as a basis for deferring the consideration of her application for leave to appeal.

  5. Ms Dimitriou has not shown any arguable error in the reasons of the primary judge.  Moreover, no substantial injustice would be occasioned, on the material before me, for refusing leave to appeal:  Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 at 231 [29]. For these reasons and those I gave earlier, the application for leave to appeal must be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding five (5) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Rares.

Associate:

Dated:        7 March 2013

Details
AGLC
Dimitriou v Curtis [2013] FCA 198
Case
[2013] FCA 198
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Georgina Dimitriou applied for leave to appeal a decision made in the Federal Court. The decision related to a sequestration order made against her by Paul Anthony Curtis. The application was heard by Rares J in the Federal Court of Australia. The central issue before the court was whether the applicant had demonstrated an arguable error in the primary judge’s reasons that would warrant granting leave to appeal. The applicant needed to show that there was a real prospect that the appeal would be successful.

The court considered the applicant’s affidavit, which detailed her conversations with a barrister who had been referred to her for legal advice. The court noted that the applicant had not filed any material related to the substantive issue of the appeal, which was whether she was solvent at the time of the sequestration order. The court concluded that the applicant had not shown any arguable error in the primary judge’s reasons and that no substantial injustice would be caused by refusing leave to appeal. The court found that the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed.

The court ordered that the application for leave to appeal be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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