Dietman v Karpany (No 2)

Dietman (the appellant) was charged with an offence under the *Fisheries Act 1971* (SA) concerning the possession of abalone. Karpany (the respondent) was the informant. The appellant had previously been acquitted of a similar charge relating to the same abalone. The appeal concerned the application of the doctrine of double jeopardy to the second prosecution.

The central legal issue before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia was whether the appellant's prior acquittal for an offence under the *Fisheries Act 1971* (SA) barred the subsequent prosecution for an offence under the *Fisheries Act 1982* (SA), notwithstanding that the two offences were distinct in law. The court was required to consider the scope and application of the principle of double jeopardy in the context of statutory offences.

The court held that the doctrine of double jeopardy, which protects an individual from being tried twice for the same offence, did not apply in this instance. The reasoning was that the two offences, although relating to the same abalone, were distinct in their statutory basis and elements. The *Fisheries Act 1971* (SA) and the *Fisheries Act 1982* (SA) created separate offences, and an acquittal under one Act did not preclude a prosecution under the other. The court emphasised that the identity of the offence, not merely the factual circumstances, is determinative for the application of the double jeopardy principle.

The appeal was dismissed.