DeWitt and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)

This matter concerned an application by Mr DeWitt to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) concerning his Disability Support Pension (DSP). Mr DeWitt had been joined as an affected party to a previous Tribunal proceeding concerning his partner, Ms JC, which resulted in a consent agreement on 27 October 2016. Mr DeWitt contended that this consent agreement altered the rate of his DSP payment from an "individual disability support pension partnered" rate to a "couples pension rate". The Secretary, Department of Social Services, was the respondent.

The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether it had jurisdiction to hear Mr DeWitt's application. This required determining if there was a reviewable decision in relation to Mr DeWitt's DSP payment rate, and whether the necessary prerequisite of a first review by an authorised review officer had occurred. The Tribunal also considered the nature of DSP payment rates for single and partnered individuals.

The Tribunal reasoned that Mr DeWitt's application lacked a jurisdictional foundation. It found no evidence of a decision by an authorised review officer or a first review decision specifically concerning Mr DeWitt's DSP payment rate. While Mr DeWitt was a party to the 2016 consent agreement concerning Ms JC's Newstart Allowance, the Tribunal found that this agreement only resulted in a minor adjustment of arrears for Mr DeWitt and did not constitute a new decision on his DSP rate. The Tribunal clarified that the terms "single" and "partnered (each)" in payment rate guides refer to the maximum basic rate for individuals and couples respectively, and that a partnered person receiving DSP is paid at the partnered rate, which is distinct from an "individual partnered" rate as Mr DeWitt asserted.

Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed Mr DeWitt's application for want of jurisdiction, concluding there was no identifiable reviewable decision before it. The Tribunal also noted that there was no identifiable question of law arising in the proceeding that would warrant a referral to the Federal Court.