De Jong v Police

In De Jong v Police, the defendant, Adam Anthony De Jong, appealed against an interim paedophile restraining order made by a Magistrate under the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA). The order restricted De Jong from loitering near children and participating in sports activities involving individuals under 18 years old. The appeal centred on procedural concerns regarding the confirmation of the interim order. On 8 April 2009, an ex parte interim order was made by Magistrate Hribal. De Jong opposed this order, arguing it exceeded the powers conferred by section 99AA of the Summary Procedure Act. The appeal did not address the merits of the order's terms, focusing instead on whether the confirmation hearing was properly conducted.

The court had to determine whether the interim paedophile restraining order and the subsequent confirmation order were validly made and whether a full confirmation hearing was undertaken as required by law. The central issue was whether the confirmation hearing was adequately conducted, given that De Jong did not consent to the making of a final order. This raised questions about the nature of the orders—whether they were final judgments or interlocutory decisions that could be subject to further proceedings.

The court examined the legislative framework and the process of confirmation hearings under the Summary Procedure Act. It considered the definition of "judgment" in the Magistrates Court Act, which includes both final and interlocutory judgments or orders. The court referenced High Court decisions, particularly Hall v Nominal Defendant, to determine whether the orders in question finally determined the rights of the parties. The court found that the confirmation order was not validly made because De Jong did not consent to it, and the hearing did not meet the requirements for a full confirmation hearing. Consequently, the court concluded that the order confirming the interim restraining order was erroneous and should be set aside.

The court ordered that the confirmation of the interim paedophile restraining order be set aside, and it directed that the case be relisted for a proper confirmation hearing. The interim order itself remained in effect pending the outcome of the relisted hearing.