Davis v Commissioner of Police

In the case of Davis v Commissioner of Police, the appellant contested his conviction for an evasion offence under section 754 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (PPRA). The appellant was also convicted of unlicensed driving, which he did not appeal. The crux of the appeal was the interpretation of what constitutes a "direction to stop" under section 748 of the PPRA. Specifically, the appellant argued that the activation of warning lights on a police vehicle without an alarm does not amount to a direction to stop, as he contended that both warning lights and an alarm must be activated. The Commissioner of Police, on the other hand, submitted that the conviction should either be remitted to the Magistrates Court for re-hearing or that this Court should make findings that both warning lights and an alarm were activated and uphold the conviction.

The court had to determine whether the activation of warning lights alone, without an accompanying alarm, could constitute a "direction to stop" under section 748 of the PPRA. This required an interpretation of the statutory language and an analysis of the evidence provided by the police officers involved. The court had to consider the testimonies of Constable Allen and Constable Black regarding the activation of the police vehicle's warning lights and alarm. The court also needed to assess the reliability and consistency of the officers' statements, particularly given that Constable Allen initially testified to the activation of the siren but later retracted this statement.

The court concluded that the activation of warning lights alone, without an accompanying alarm, does indeed constitute a "direction to stop" under section 748(1)(c)(ii) of the PPRA. This interpretation was based on the plain language of the statute, which does not require both a warning light and an alarm to be activated. The court found that Constable Allen's eventual testimony, supported by contemporaneous documents, established that only the warning lights were activated. Given this finding, the court allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction for the evasion offence. The court did not remit the matter to the Magistrates Court but instead entered a verdict of acquittal on that charge.

The final orders of the court included allowing the appeal, setting aside the conviction for the evasion offence, entering a verdict of acquittal for that charge, and making no order as to costs. This decision clarifies the requirements for a "direction to stop" under the PPRA and underscores the importance of statutory interpretation in criminal appeals.