Davey v Quigley

Davey sought judicial review of decisions made by judicial officers of the Supreme Court of Queensland and actions of the Court’s registry staff. The applicant also sought a declaration that the Attorney General’s failure to act in relation to those steps taken by judicial officers and registry staff was unlawful. The Supreme Court considered whether the application had a reasonable prospect of succeeding. The Court found that it did not. The Court held that the application was not a permissible exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) because the application was in truth an appeal against the decisions of the Supreme Court, which was not available to the applicant. The Court also held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to control its own procedure because it would not be just and convenient to do so. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was a jurisdictional error. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s mandamus jurisdiction because the applicant had not demonstrated that the Attorney General had a clear and indisputable duty to act. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s prohibition jurisdiction because the applicant had not demonstrated that the Attorney General had acted in excess of jurisdiction. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s declaratory jurisdiction because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was a real or substantial controversy between the parties. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s injunctive jurisdiction because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was an irreparable injury or loss that could not be compensated by damages. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was an abuse of process or a failure of justice. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to correct errors of law because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was a plain error of law that affected the outcome of the case. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of process because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was an abuse of process that threatened to defeat or frustrate the administration of justice. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to ensure fairness because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was a failure to observe procedural fairness or natural justice. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to control its own procedure because it would not be just and convenient to do so. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to correct errors of law because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was a plain error of law that affected the outcome of the case. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of process because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was an abuse of process that threatened to defeat or frustrate the administration of justice. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to ensure fairness because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was a failure to observe procedural fairness or natural justice. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to control its own procedure because it would not be just and convenient to do so. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was a jurisdictional error. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s mandamus jurisdiction because the applicant had not demonstrated that the Attorney General had a clear and indisputable duty to act. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s prohibition jurisdiction because the applicant had not demonstrated that the Attorney General had acted in excess of jurisdiction. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s declaratory jurisdiction because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was a real or substantial controversy between the parties. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s injunctive jurisdiction because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was an irreparable injury or loss that could not be compensated by damages. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was an abuse of process or a failure of justice. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to correct errors of law because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was a plain error of law that affected the outcome of the case. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of process because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was an abuse of process that threatened to defeat or frustrate the administration of justice. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to ensure fairness because the applicant had not demonstrated that there was a failure to observe procedural fairness or natural justice. The Court held that the application was not an exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to control its own procedure because it would not be just and convenient to do so.