Dagi, Shackles, Ambetu,Maun v At-G for Vic

The applicants, Dagi, Shackles, and Ambetu, and the respondent, the Attorney-General for Victoria, were parties to proceedings before the High Court of Australia concerning the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the *Crimes (Classification of Offences) Act 1981* (Vic). The core of the dispute revolved around whether these provisions, which allowed for the classification of offences into different categories, were consistent with the separation of powers doctrine as enshrined in the Australian Constitution.

The High Court was required to determine whether the Victorian Act, by empowering the executive government to classify offences and thereby affect the severity of penalties and the mode of trial, impermissibly encroached upon the judicial power of the Commonwealth. Specifically, the court considered whether the Act delegated legislative power to the executive or improperly conferred judicial power on the executive, thereby contravening Chapter III of the Constitution.

The majority of the Court, comprising Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ, held that the *Crimes (Classification of Offences) Act 1981* (Vic) was constitutionally valid. Their Honours reasoned that the Act did not involve an impermissible delegation of legislative power, as the Parliament had laid down the criteria for classification and the executive was merely implementing those criteria. Furthermore, they found that the classification of offences did not constitute an exercise of judicial power, but rather a legislative function that determined the framework within which judicial power would operate. The Court distinguished between the power to classify offences and the power to adjudicate guilt or impose punishment, finding that the former remained a legislative or executive function, not a judicial one.