Dagi, Shackles, Ambetu, Maun v At-G for Vic

The applicants, Dagi, Shackles, Ambetu, and Maun, sought judicial review of a decision made by the respondent, the Attorney-General for Victoria. The dispute concerned the Attorney-General's refusal to grant the applicants leave to commence proceedings for a declaration that certain provisions of the *Crimes (Classification of Offences) Act 1981* (Vic) were invalid. The applicants contended that these provisions, which classified certain offences as indictable but not triable on indictment, were beyond the legislative power of the Victorian Parliament. The matter came before Dawson J of the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the *Crimes (Classification of Offences) Act 1981* (Vic) was constitutionally valid. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the Act, by classifying certain offences as indictable but not triable on indictment, contravened the implied prohibition against the creation of a class of persons who could be subjected to criminal prosecution without the safeguards afforded by trial on indictment, as purportedly guaranteed by Chapter III of the Australian Constitution.

Dawson J reasoned that the Australian Constitution does not confer upon individuals a right to be tried on indictment for all criminal offences. His Honour found that the historical context and the express provisions of the Constitution did not support the implication of such a broad right. The power of the States to define and regulate criminal procedure, including the classification of offences and the modes of trial, remained largely unfettered by the Commonwealth Constitution, provided that the State legislation did not otherwise infringe upon the constitutional framework, particularly concerning the exercise of federal judicial power. The Court concluded that the Victorian Act did not offend Chapter III of the Constitution.