Da Silva v Director of Public Prosecutions; Da Silva v Director of Public Prosecutions; Spence v Director of Public Prosecutions

The applicants in these consolidated cases were each charged with various offences related to trafficking. Each applicant applied for bail, which the Crown opposed on the basis that each was a participant in a criminal organisation under section 16(3A) of the Bail Act 1980 (Qld). The court was required to determine the meaning of the phrase "participant in a criminal organisation" as it appears in section 16(3A) of the Bail Act. The court also needed to decide whether the time at which the applicant must be a participant in a criminal organisation was at the time of the offence or the time of the bail application, and whether reference to extrinsic materials was permissible in construing the statute.

The court examined the plain grammatical meaning of the statute, finding that it was clear that the applicant must be a participant in a criminal organisation at the time of the bail application. The court held that the purposes of the Bail Act or recent amendments did not require modification of the plain grammatical meaning of the statute. The court also held that it was permissible to refer to extrinsic materials in construing the statute, including the Explanatory Notes to the Bail Amendment Bill 2016 (Qld) and the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bail Amendment Bill 2016 (Qld). The court found that these materials demonstrated that the purpose of section 16(3A) was to prevent bail to those who are involved in organised crime at the time of their bail application.

The court concluded that each of the applicants was a participant in a criminal organisation at the time of their bail application, and therefore, the applications for bail were refused. The court emphasised that the purpose of section 16(3A) was to prevent bail to those who are involved in organised crime at the time of their bail application, and that this purpose was not limited to those who are involved in organised crime at the time of the offence. The court held that the Crown had made out each of the applicants as a participant in a criminal organisation within the meaning of section 16(3A) of the Bail Act.