CUNNINGHAM & CUNNINGHAM

This matter concerned an application by the Director-General of the Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services (the Department) to appeal an order made by Forrest J. The order required the Department to provide unredacted copies of documents previously supplied in redacted form to the court in child-related proceedings. The Department had relied on section 186 of the *Child Protection Act 1999* (Qld) to redact the documents, which protects the confidentiality of persons who notify concerns about child harm or risk of harm.

The central legal issue before the court was whether Forrest J had erred in ordering the production of unredacted documents, specifically concerning the identity of the notifier, when section 69ZW(3)(b) of the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth) and section 186 of the *Child Protection Act 1999* (Qld) both contained provisions preserving the confidentiality of notifiers. The court was required to consider the interplay between federal and state legislation in this context and the circumstances under which a court could override such confidentiality provisions.

The court noted that section 69ZW(3)(b) of the *Family Law Act* specifically preserves to the agency the decision about whether to provide material that identifies the person who made a notification. It also acknowledged the decision in *Director-General, DFCS v Jordan* (2012) 47 Fam LR 666, which affirmed this principle. While section 69ZW(5) mandates the admission of documents provided in response to an order, subsection (6) imposes strict limitations on the disclosure of a notifier's identity, requiring consent or a finding that disclosure is critically important to the proceedings and that failure to disclose would prejudice the administration of justice. Similarly, section 186 of the *Child Protection Act* requires leave from the court to give evidence of a notifier's identity, which can only be granted if there is critical importance and a compelling public interest reason for disclosure, or if the notifier consents. The court considered that the Director-General had relied on section 186 of the *Child Protection Act* as the basis for redaction.

The court found that Forrest J had made the order for unredacted documents with awareness of section 69ZW(3)(b) and the *Jordan* decision, and also of arrangements for providing unredacted documents to the court. The Director-General had relied on section 186 of the *Child Protection Act* for the redactions. The court ultimately upheld the appeal, finding that the Director-General had not been afforded a proper opportunity to make submissions regarding the potential disclosure of the notifier's identity under section 69ZW(6)(b) and section 186(3) and (4) of the *Child Protection Act*. The matter was remitted to the primary judge for further consideration.