Croome v Tasmania

The plaintiffs, Croome and others, sought a declaration that Tasmania's *Criminal Code Act 1924* (Tas) was inconsistent with the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR), to which Australia was a party, and therefore invalid under s 109 of the *Australian Constitution*. The defendant, the State of Tasmania, applied to strike out the plaintiffs' application for want of jurisdiction, arguing that the case did not constitute a "matter" within the meaning of s 76(i) of the *Constitution* and s 30(a) of the *Judiciary Act 1903* (Cth). The High Court of Australia was required to determine whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the action, considering whether their claim was a genuine controversy or "matter" and whether they possessed a sufficient interest in the subject matter to maintain the proceedings.

The Court considered whether the plaintiffs' claim, which sought to invalidate a Tasmanian law based on its inconsistency with an international treaty, could be characterised as a "matter" arising under the *Constitution* or involving its interpretation. The central question was whether the plaintiffs' assertion of inconsistency, without demonstrating a direct personal grievance or a specific legal right being infringed by the operation of the Tasmanian law, was sufficient to engage the jurisdiction of the High Court. The Court examined the nature of the relief sought and whether it was divorced from any attempt to administer or enforce the allegedly inconsistent law, focusing on the requirement for a real and not hypothetical controversy.

The majority of the Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the action. They reasoned that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that they had a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the litigation to constitute a "matter" for the purposes of the *Constitution* and the *Judiciary Act*. The Court distinguished this case from those where standing had been granted, emphasizing that the plaintiffs were not seeking to challenge the application of the law to themselves, nor were they asserting a right that was being directly affected by the law. The mere assertion of inconsistency with an international treaty, without more, was not enough to confer standing.

The defendant's summons to strike out the plaintiffs' application was dismissed with costs, including reserved costs.