FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Croker v Commissioner of Taxation [2006] FCA 720
CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
NSD 716 OF 2006
EDMONDS J
8 JUNE 2006
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 716 OF 2006
BETWEEN:
CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER
ApplicantAND:
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 MAY 2006
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal be refused.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 716 OF 2006
BETWEEN:
CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER
ApplicantAND:
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 JUNE 2006
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 716 OF 2006
BETWEEN:
CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER
ApplicantAND:
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE:
8 JUNE 2006
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
EDMONDS J:
The applicant, Mr Croker, applies for leave to appeal from the judgment of a judge of this Court (Cowdroy J) dismissing an application seeking relief in the form of damages for alleged tortious conduct on the part of the respondent, the Commissioner of Taxation. Certain ancillary relief was also sought.
The learned primary judge dismissed the application on the ground that this Court had no jurisdiction to hear it. Moreover, he concluded that even if the Court did have jurisdiction to hear the claims, the Court would strike out the pleadings as not disclosing any reasonable cause of action: O 11 r 16 of the Federal Court Rules.
Mr Croker’s application for leave to appeal was accompanied by a draft notice of appeal. However, that draft contains no arguable ground of appeal. I do not find that surprising because I am unable to identify any error in the judgment below.
If an appeal would be doomed to fail, or if no arguable ground of appeal is raised by the applicant, or if the judgment below is not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant allowing an appeal to go forward, there will be no grant of leave to appeal: SZDGN v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1543 at [11] per Lindgren J. As in that case, the applicant fails at this first hurdle. I should perhaps add that, assuming the learned primary judge’s decision to be wrong, having regard to the history of the proceedings between Mr Croker and the Commissioner of Taxation, I do not consider that substantial injustice would be caused to Mr Croker by refusal of leave: cf., Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397; Ogawa v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 135 at [21].
In all the circumstances, the application must be refused with costs.
I certify that the preceding five (5) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Edmonds. Associate:
Dated: 8 June 2006
Solicitor for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Date of Hearing: 30 May 2006 Date of Judgment: 8 June 2006
- AGLC
- Croker v Commissioner of Taxation [2006] FCA 720
- Case
- [2006] FCA 720
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court centred on the interpretation of sections of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, particularly those pertaining to the assessability of payments received by individuals in the course of their employment. The primary issue was whether the payments in question were ordinary income, assessable under the statute. This issue required the court to carefully examine the nature of the payments and their relationship to the applicant's employment.
The High Court found that the Full Federal Court's interpretation of the relevant sections of the statute was consistent with the ordinary meaning of the words used. The court held that the payments in question were indeed ordinary income and, therefore, assessable. The High Court emphasised the importance of adhering to the ordinary meaning of statutory words unless there is clear legislative intent to the contrary. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was refused, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal be refused.
1. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: EDMONDS J
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