Crawford v Forna

In the case of Crawford v Forna, the plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries that arose from a motor vehicle accident that occurred in 2007. The plaintiff had obtained an extension of the limitation period and was given leave to commence proceedings within 60 days of a compulsory conference being held or of the parties’ agreement to dispense with the compulsory conference or of an order of the court dispensing with the compulsory conference. An order was made on 16 September 2015 stating that if the compulsory conference was not held on or before 28 November 2015 it was to be dispensed with and the plaintiff was to commence proceedings within 60 days. No compulsory conference was held, and the plaintiff failed to commence proceedings within the 60 day period. The plaintiff’s solicitors asked the court not to visit the plaintiff’s failings on them, and the plaintiff had a history of delay and non-compliance with provisions of the Act. The plaintiff sought leave to commence proceedings by 5 February 2016, and the second defendant applied for summary judgment.

The legal issues that the court was required to decide were whether the second defendant’s application for summary judgment should be granted and whether the plaintiff’s application for leave to commence proceedings under s 57(2)(b) of the Act should be dismissed. The court had to consider the history of delay and non-compliance with provisions of the Act, the failure of the plaintiff to commence proceedings within the 60 day period, and the plaintiff’s application for leave to commence proceedings by 5 February 2016.

The court held that the second defendant’s application for summary judgment should be granted, and the plaintiff’s application for leave to commence proceedings under s 57(2)(b) of the Act should be dismissed. The court noted that the plaintiff had a history of delay and non-compliance with provisions of the Act, and the failure to commence proceedings within the 60 day period was a significant factor in the court’s decision. The court also noted that the plaintiff’s solicitors had asked the court not to visit the plaintiff’s failings on them, but the court held that the plaintiff’s history of delay and non-compliance with provisions of the Act was a matter for the plaintiff and not the solicitors.

The court shall hear the parties as to costs. The second defendant’s application for summary judgment is granted, and the plaintiff’s application for leave to commence proceedings under s 57(2)(b) of the Act is dismissed. The court held that the plaintiff’s history of delay and non-compliance with provisions of the Act, and the failure to commence proceedings within the 60 day period, were significant factors in the court’s decision. The court also noted that the plaintiff’s solicitors had asked the court not to visit the plaintiff’s failings on them, but the court held that the plaintiff’s history of delay and non-compliance with provisions of the Act was a matter for the plaintiff and not the solicitors.