Coyne v Citizen Finance Limited

This matter concerns an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, brought by Citizen Finance Limited (the applicant) against a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The dispute arose from a defamation action where a jury had initially awarded $150,000 in damages against the applicant and $50,000 against its director. The Full Court, by majority, upheld an appeal against this award, finding the damages excessive and reducing the award against the applicant to $50,000. The applicant sought special leave on the ground of the administration of justice, contending the majority decision was wrong in principle.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the majority of the Full Court had failed to apply, or recognise, the correct legal principle when assessing the excessiveness of a jury's damages award in a defamation case. Specifically, the applicant argued that the majority did not adhere to the principle that a court must assume the jury took the view of the evidence most consistent with the size of the verdict returned, meaning all factual issues should be assumed to have been found in favour of the plaintiff. The applicant contended that this principle was not merely misapplied but was entirely overlooked by the majority, unlike the dissenting Chief Justice who, it was submitted, correctly applied it.

The applicant's argument was that the majority of the Full Court erred by not applying the established principle that when reviewing a jury's assessment of damages for excessiveness, the court must assume that the jury found all issues of fact in favour of the plaintiff, provided there was some evidence to support such findings. This principle, derived from cases such as *Progress and Properties v Craft*, dictates that the court should consider the evidence in the light most favourable to the plaintiff to determine if the jury's award could be justified. The applicant asserted that the majority failed to engage with this principle, leading to an incorrect reduction of the damages awarded. The applicant also noted that a separate ground of appeal concerning the propriety of leaving evidence of financial loss to the jury was unanimously dismissed by the Full Court, with all judges agreeing that such damages could be considered in a defamation case where business or financial losses were likely and claimed generally.