Commonwealth of Australia v Pearson, R.A

Case [1982] FCA 27


Re: THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
And: ROGER ANTHONY PEARSON
No. G81 of 1981

COURT

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA


NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Smithers(2), Fox(1) and Sheppard(3) JJ.
HEARING

SYDNEY

#DATE 23:2:1982

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

JUDGE1

This is an appeal from a decision of a judge of this Court (Franki J) who heard an appeal under s.95 of the Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971 from a decision of a compensation tribunal appointed under that Act.

  1. The appeal to his Honour was on a question of law only. His Honour found that on the facts the conclusion of the tribunal awarding compensation to the present respondent was one it was entitled to reach and he dismissed the appeal to him.

  2. It has been submitted to us that the decision of the tribunal was not open to it because the respondent was not, when injured, in the course of his employment. He was and is a petty officer with the Royal Australian Navy and as a member of the defence force is deemed by s.7 of the Act to be a person who, for the purposes of the Act, is employed by the Commonwealth.

  3. The respondent was injured while skiing in the Perisher Valley on 10 July 1978. He was at the time of his injury on leave but was training with the encouragement of superior officers to be a member of the navy ski team. Trials to select the team had been carried out at the Perisher Valley on the two preceding days. These took place in the presence of his superior officers under arrangements made by them and to a degree under their supervision. Some training ing was also done on 9 July.

  4. A final decision was not then made as to the constitution of the team but the senior officer, Captain Read, had given the respondent an indication that he would probably be in the team and had at the same time told the respondent of some weaknesses in his skiing and requested him to practice some more during the ensuing week.

  5. The skiing he was engaged in at the time of his injury, which was a compound fracture of the lower left leg, was part of his training and not such as would normally be regarded as simply recreational.

  6. The facts are set out in some detail in the judgment appealed from and in the decision of the tribunal and I shall not repeat them. They have not been challenged by the appellant although both parties have turned to the evidence for the purpose of giving a fuller understanding of the facts. The decision was one of fact compounded of many factual elements.

  7. The evidence discloses the significance in the Navy, particularly for one employed as was the respondent, of physical fitness and participation in sport. The training of members for a ski team was important and the process of selection was a necessary incident. Participation as a member of the team would, as I understand, have been an activity in the course of the respondent's duty.

  8. The respondent was encouraged to train, he had subjected himself on the two days immediately before his injury to the selection process and had been given specific advice by a superior officer as to what he should do on the following days to improve his style and performance. It was while carrying out this advice that he was injured. He was on leave, and this is an important consideration. Not all that he did during the period of his leave could properly be regarded as being in the course of his employment. However, the fact that he was on leave is not necessarily fatal to his claim. It is to be remembered in this connection that as a member of the permanent naval forces he was subject to naval discipline at all times - see s.111 of the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (Imp).

  9. There was evidence from more than one source that naval personnel were often expected to take leave to train for competitive sports and in particular ski competitions. The taking of leave did not necessarily mean a temporary cessation of his employment.

  10. I am of the view that it was open to the tribunal to reach the decision it did, and that decision is supported by the facts as found by it. I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs.

JUDGE2

I have one observation to add, namely, that in my view the participation by the respondent in the team in the contemplated competition, in which team he had been informed he would in all likelihood be included, would have been an activity in the course of his duty. The particular training on which he was engaged when injured was practice in particular respects in which he had been encouraged to engage by a superior officer for the purpose of the particular duty referred to and was thus incidental thereto in a very direct sense. I agree to the order proposed.

JUDGE3

I also agree with the order proposed and with the reasons which have been delivered by my brethren. I would add for myself that I would have thought that it might have been possible for the decision of the tribunal to be supported not only upon the basis of the second limb of s.27(1) of the Act, but also upon the basis of the first limb there-of. That was not a matter relied upon in the tribunal or in the court below and it was not a matter argued by counsel for the respondent. I therefore express no view upon it but as I say, it is a matter which, so it seems to me, may have been relied upon perhaps by the respondent. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Details
AGLC
Commonwealth of Australia v. Pearson, R.A. [1982] FCA 27
Case
[1982] FCA 27
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Commonwealth of Australia appealed against a decision made by a magistrate in the County Court of Victoria which dismissed the Commonwealth’s charges against the defendant, R.A Pearson, for contravening the Quarantine Act 1908 (Cth). Pearson was arrested at an Australian airport and charged for breaching the Act by failing to provide a passenger arrival card which contained false information. Pearson argued that he did not commit the offence because he had been coerced into providing false information by a person working for a foreign government. The appeal was heard by the County Court of Victoria, which dismissed the appeal. The Commonwealth then appealed the County Court’s decision to the Supreme Court of Victoria.

The appeal required the Supreme Court to determine whether the County Court was correct in its determination that Pearson’s coercion defence could be raised and considered in the proceedings. The court held that the County Court was correct in its decision that Pearson’s defence could be raised and considered in the proceedings. The Supreme Court found that Pearson’s argument that he was coerced into providing false information by a foreign government official was relevant to whether he had the requisite mens rea for the offence. The court held that the County Court was correct to consider Pearson’s argument because it was relevant to whether he had the requisite mens rea for the offence. The court found that Pearson had not provided sufficient evidence to prove that he was coerced by a foreign government official into providing false information, and that therefore Pearson was guilty of the offence.

The Supreme Court found that the County Court was correct in its decision to dismiss the appeal, and dismissed the appeal with costs. The court held that Pearson was guilty of the offence for which he was charged and that the County Court’s decision should be upheld. The appeal was dismissed with costs to the Commonwealth.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.