Commissioner of State Revenue v Placer Dome Inc (Now an Amalgamated Entity named Barrick Gold Corporation)

The Commissioner of State Revenue sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia from orders of the Western Australian Court of Appeal. The dispute concerned the valuation of land for the purposes of stamp duty, specifically under section 76ATI(2)(b) of the relevant legislation, which required determining if the value of a corporation's land constituted 60% or more of the value of all its property. The Commissioner argued that the Court of Appeal erred in rejecting the approach taken by the Tribunal, which had adopted a "top-down" valuation method.

The central legal issue before the High Court was the correct construction of section 76ATI(2)(b) and the proper method for valuing a corporation's land and total property for the purpose of the 60% test. This involved determining whether the valuation should consider assets individually or as a bundle, and whether concepts such as goodwill were relevant to the statutory question. The Commissioner contended that the Court of Appeal's rejection of the Tribunal's "top-down" approach, which followed a Queensland precedent, constituted an error.

The Commissioner's argument focused on the interpretation of the statutory provision, submitting that the "top-down" approach, where the total value of property is determined and then specific exclusions are made, was the correct method. This approach was contrasted with the Court of Appeal's preferred method, which involved a "restoration method" for valuing mining tenements, essentially requiring a hypothetical reconstruction of the business. The Commissioner argued this method was erroneous and that the valuation should reflect the assets as they are within the operating corporation. The Commissioner also contended that the Court of Appeal misapplied the principles of goodwill as established in *Murry*, asserting that the attraction of custom remains central to the concept of goodwill.

The respondent, Placer Dome Inc, argued that the special leave questions did not arise on the facts or the way the case was conducted below. They contended that the case proceeded on an agreed basis of valuing property for exchange, not use, and that the valuation of goodwill was irrelevant to the statutory question, as direct valuations of the land were undertaken. The respondent submitted that both the Tribunal and the Court of Appeal correctly found that the Act did not require the attribution of value to goodwill, and that the critical issue was the direct valuation of land assets using discounted cash flow methodology, with the choice of gold prices being the decisive factor.