Commissioner of State Revenue v Bulzomi (2009) 24 VR 643; Kowaliw & Kowaliw (1981) FLC 91-092; New South Wales Police Force v Winter [2011] NSWCA 330; (2011) 10 DDCR 69; Palis Victoria Pty Ltd & Ors v Gelare International Pty Ltd & Ors (2015) 302 FLR 127;

This matter concerned an application by the husband for property settlement orders, with the wife seeking to rely on a deed executed in 1999. The central dispute revolved around the admissibility and effect of this deed, which was alleged to have created an express trust in favour of the wife's parents concerning 10% of a property. The court was required to consider the implications of the deed not being stamped and the relevant provisions of the *Stamps Act 1958* (Vic.) and the *Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984* (Vic.).

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the unstamped deed, executed in 1999, could be admitted into evidence and relied upon to establish the wife's declaration of trust. This involved an examination of sections 8, 9, 10, and 30 of the *Stamps Act 1958*, which stipulated that unstamped instruments could not be used or pleaded in evidence, nor be of any validity, except in criminal proceedings. The court also had to consider the effect of the repeal of the *Stamps Act 1958* on liabilities incurred under it, as preserved by section 14 of the *Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984*. Furthermore, the court noted, albeit not raised by the parties, that an express trust in respect of land requires writing pursuant to section 53(1)(b) of the *Property Law Act 1958* (Vic.).

The court reasoned that despite the repeal of the *Stamps Act 1958*, the liability to pay stamp duty and the evidentiary consequences of non-compliance remained in force due to section 14 of the *Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984*. Consequently, the unstamped deed could not be received in evidence. The court held that in the absence of the deed being admissible, there was no written evidence to support the wife's claim that she had declared a trust in favour of her parents in 1999.

The court made orders regarding the division of property and liabilities between the parties. Specifically, the wife was ordered to pay the husband a sum representing his half share of a motor vehicle loan. Further, the wife was ordered to pay a significant sum to the husband by a specified date, failing which the property at C Street was to be sold. The proceeds of the sale were to be applied first to sale costs, then to discharge any mortgage, with the remaining balance split 30% to the husband and 70% to the wife. Pending the payment or sale, the wife was granted sole occupation of the property, responsible for mortgage instalments, rates, and taxes, and restrained from further encumbering the property without the husband's consent. Each party was to retain their other property and superannuation entitlements, with individual liability for their respective assets and liabilities.