Commissioner of Police v Phillip Raymond Duffield No. Scgrg-97-680 Judgment No. 6221 Number of Pages 3 Police

The Supreme Court of South Australia dealt with an appeal brought by the Commissioner of Police against a decision made by the Police Disciplinary Tribunal, presided over by Miss R F Hayes SM. The Commissioner had lodged a complaint against the respondent, a police officer, alleging 112 breaches of Regulation 27 under the Police Regulation Act. The alleged breaches involved the respondent passing confidential information to a person not entitled to receive it, with the offences occurring between 7 May 1991 and 21 April 1995. The complaint was lodged on 18 December 1996. The respondent argued that the complaint was out of time, citing a six-month limit as per Section 52 of the Summary Procedure Act. The Tribunal ruled in favour of the respondent, concluding that the complaint was indeed out of time. The Commissioner appealed this decision, arguing that there is no time limit for laying disciplinary charges against police officers.

The court needed to determine whether the Police Disciplinary Tribunal was correct in ruling that the complaint was out of time, and if the changes in the legislative scheme since the decision in Suter v Farrelly (1984) 35 SASR 535 warranted a different conclusion. The central issue was whether the legislative changes effectively introduced a time limit for laying disciplinary charges against police officers. The court also had to consider whether the reasoning in Suter v Farrelly was still applicable given the legislative changes.

The court found that the legislative changes did not introduce a time limit for laying disciplinary charges against police officers. The court followed the reasoning in Suter v Farrelly, which held that the Justices Act procedure, now the Summary Procedure Act, applied only to the hearing of the charge and not to matters antecedent to the hearing, such as the time limit for laying the charge. The court held that the changes in the legislation did not affect the substantive law, and therefore, the reasoning in Suter v Farrelly remained valid. The court also noted that the changes in the wording of the relevant sections and regulations did not alter their effect. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was returned to the Tribunal for further proceedings.

The court allowed the appeal and returned the matter to the Tribunal to be dealt with in accordance with the reasons given in the judgment. The court clarified that while the appeal was successful, the issue of whether there was an abuse of process due to the significant lapse of time between the alleged offences and the complaint would still need to be addressed by the Tribunal.