Civil Unions Act 2006 (ACT)

This case involved an application by a person to have a notice served on their former civil union partner in a manner other than personal service, as provided under the Civil Unions Act 2006 (ACT). The applicant sought an order from the Supreme Court under section 8(4) of the Act, which allows for an alternative method of service if personal service is impracticable. The respondent argued that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence of identity and age, as required by section 8(1) of the Act. The court had to determine whether the evidence provided by the applicant was sufficient to establish their identity and age, and whether the Supreme Court was correct in its decision to deny the application for alternative service of the notice.

The court found that the evidence provided by the applicant was sufficient to establish their identity and age. The applicant had provided a statutory declaration stating that it was impracticable to obtain a birth certificate, citizenship certificate, or current passport, and had included details of when and where they were born. The court noted that section 8(1) of the Act allows for a statutory declaration to be used as evidence of identity and age if it is impracticable to obtain other documents. The court also found that the respondent had not provided any evidence to suggest that the applicant's statutory declaration was not accurate or reliable. Therefore, the court concluded that the applicant had provided sufficient evidence of identity and age.

The court further found that the Supreme Court was correct in its decision to deny the application for alternative service of the notice. The court noted that section 8(4) of the Act requires the Supreme Court to be satisfied that it is impracticable for the notice to be served personally, and that the alternative way is reasonably likely to bring the notice to the attention of the party. The court found that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that it was impracticable to serve the notice personally, and that the alternative method of service was reasonably likely to bring the notice to the attention of the respondent. Therefore, the court concluded that the Supreme Court was correct in its decision to deny the application for alternative service of the notice.

The final orders of the court were that the applicant's application for alternative service of the notice be dismissed, and that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application.