Chief Executive, Department for Health & Ageing v The CORONER'S Court of South Australia

The Supreme Court of South Australia considered an application for judicial review brought by the Chief Executive of the Department for Health & Ageing against the Coroner’s Court of South Australia. The dispute arose from an inquest into the death of a patient, MP, at the Women's and Children's Hospital. The Deputy Coroner, investigating MP's death, sought to examine an earlier death at the same hospital, MH, which was due to the same rare condition. This earlier death had been the subject of an investigation by a committee established under Part 7 of the *Health Care Act 2008* (SA), which provides significant protections and restrictions on the disclosure of information. The Chief Executive objected to producing documents sought by a summons issued by the Deputy Coroner, arguing they were protected by section 66 of the *Health Care Act 2008*.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Coroner erred in law by finding that the Chief Executive was required to produce documents protected by Part 7 of the *Health Care Act 2008*, and whether the summons issued by the Coroner's Court effectively sought to circumvent the protections afforded by section 66 of that Act. Specifically, the Court had to determine the extent of the protections under section 66 and whether the Coroner was entitled to assume that the Chief Executive would possess or could obtain material regulated by that section, and then compel its production.

The Court reasoned that the prohibitions in section 66(2) of the *Health Care Act 2008* against making records of, or disclosing, information gathered in connection with authorised committee activities were absolute, save for specific exceptions not relevant in this case. These prohibitions extended to disclosure to any court, agency, or body, including the Chief Executive. The Court found that the Deputy Coroner had erred in assuming the Chief Executive would come into possession of information regulated by section 66 and in issuing a summons that appeared to target documents held by the committee, thereby potentially going behind the statutory protections. The Court held that the summons, as worded, was explicit and could not be read down to require production only of lawfully disclosed, non-identifying material.

Consequently, the Court quashed the Deputy Coroner's ruling and set aside the summons. The Court clarified that while the Deputy Coroner was entitled to issue a summons, the Chief Executive was not required to produce documents that he could not lawfully obtain. The Court also noted that a superior court retains the power to inspect documents to determine if an immunity or privilege applies, and that section 66 did not contain language to revoke this power.