Chapman-Davis v State of New South Wales

Chapman-Davis brought an application against the State of New South Wales seeking declaratory relief regarding her entitlement to workers compensation under the Workers Compensation Act. The central dispute concerns the interpretation of Item 25 in Part 19H of Schedule 6 of the Workers Compensation Act, specifically whether the term "paramedic" and "operational duties" should be construed by reference to award classification or the duties performed during a secondment period. The applicant, who was classified as a paramedic under the relevant award at the time of her injury, was seconded to a role as a Health Advisor during which she did not perform the duties of an operational paramedic. The court was tasked with determining the appropriate scope of the term "paramedic" and whether the applicant's secondment affected her entitlement to compensation under the Act.

The primary legal issues involved the construction of the term "paramedic" within the context of the Schedule, whether extrinsic material such as parliamentary debates could be considered, and the application of the noscitur a sociis principle to the text. The court considered whether the word "operational" should be read into the Schedule and whether the applicant was a "paramedic" within the meaning of the Schedule at the time of her injury. The court examined the legislative purpose and intent, and the meaning of the term "paramedic" as it was applied in the context of the applicant's award classification and her employment status at the time of her injury.

The Court found that the term "paramedic" should be construed by reference to the applicant's award classification and her employment status at the time of her injury, rather than the duties she performed during her secondment. The Court determined that the Schedule provides an exemption from the amendments to the workers compensation legislative scheme to nominated classes of emergency services workers, and that the applicant fell within this classification. The Court held that the meaning of "paramedic" in the context of the Schedule denotes an employee who is classified as a paramedic under the award and appointed to a paramedic position by the Ambulance Service of New South Wales. The Court found that the applicant was such an employee at the time of her injury, and therefore, the exemption in the Schedule applied to her.

The Court concluded that it was appropriate to exercise the discretion under the Industrial Relations Act to make a declaratory order consistent with the terms of the second declaration sought by the applicant. The Court directed the applicant to file and serve draft orders reflecting the terms of the decision within 14 days, with an opportunity for the respondents to file submissions in reply. The Court also directed the parties to file and serve any applications as to costs and related submissions within the same timeframe. The Court specified that the declaratory order should temporally extend no further than the date of the applicant's injury.