CHAMBER & DIMMOCK

In the matter of *Chamber & Dimmock*, Austin J of the Family Court of Australia considered an application by the father to vary existing final parenting orders. The dispute arose from the child's refusal to spend time with the father, coupled with the termination of services by the supervising contact centre and the discovery that the child's maternal grandfather had previously been employed by that centre.

The court was required to determine whether there had been a material change in circumstances or a material new factor, as required by the threshold established in *Rice v Asplund*, before existing final parenting orders could be varied. Further, the court considered whether a final hearing could be conducted on the issue of appointing a changed supervisor and whether a distinction between consequential and substantive orders was applicable to parenting orders in this context.

Austin J found that the child's attitude towards spending time with the father had not changed, and therefore, no material change in circumstances or material new factor had been established. The termination of the contact centre's services was also not considered a material change in circumstances, nor was the knowledge of the maternal grandfather's prior employment. Consequently, the court held that the *Rice v Asplund* threshold had not been met, and the father's application to vary the parenting orders could not proceed.

The Initiating Application filed by the father and the Response filed by the mother were dismissed. Costs were reserved for 28 days, and all other outstanding applications were also dismissed.