CEG v The Queen

The case of CEG v The Queen involves an interlocutory appeal brought by the defendant, CEG, against the refusal to certify a ruling made by the primary judge. The dispute revolves around the admissibility of evidence provided by two complainants in a case of sexual offences. The court hearing the appeal was the High Court of Australia. The defendant, CEG, sought a review of the primary judge's refusal to certify the decision under section 295 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009.

The legal issues before the court centred on whether the primary judge had erred in ruling the complainants' evidence admissible as tendency evidence under section 97 of the Evidence Act 2008. The defendant argued that the primary judge had failed to properly consider the relevance and probative value of the complainants' evidence, and that the ruling had prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial. The court was required to determine whether the primary judge's decision was legally sound and whether the evidence was properly admitted under the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act.

The court found that the primary judge had indeed erred in ruling the complainants' evidence admissible as tendency evidence. The court held that the primary judge had failed to properly consider the relevance and probative value of the evidence, and that the ruling had prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial. However, the court also found that the error was not significant enough to warrant certification, and therefore denied the application for leave to appeal. The court's reasoning was based on the principle that the admission of evidence is a matter within the discretion of the primary judge, and that the court should only intervene in cases of clear error. The court held that the primary judge's error in this case did not amount to such clear error.

The final orders of the court were to allow the application for review of the refusal to certify, but to refuse leave to appeal. This means that the defendant's application was successful in that the court found that the primary judge had erred in admitting the complainants' evidence as tendency evidence. However, the court found that the error was not significant enough to warrant an appeal, and therefore denied the application for leave to appeal. The primary judge's ruling on the admissibility of the evidence therefore stands.