Cameron v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation

This case concerned an appeal by Donald Norman Cameron to the Supreme Court of Tasmania against an income tax assessment. The appeal was based on the ground that certain Statutory Rules, specifically Statutory Rules 1918, No. 315, were invalid and beyond the legislative powers of the Commonwealth. Ewing J. of the Supreme Court of Tasmania referred the matter to the High Court of Australia for its opinion, as it involved significant legal questions regarding the validity of the regulations and their potential conflict with the Australian Constitution.

The High Court was required to determine whether Statutory Rules 1918, No. 315, and specifically regulation 46A and Table III of the Income Tax Regulations 1917, were beyond the legislative powers of the Commonwealth. This involved considering whether these rules discriminated between States or parts of States, thereby infringing section 51(II) of the Constitution. The court also considered whether the Act and regulations created a tax on certain livestock in some parts of Australia but not others, constituting a further discrimination between States.

The Court reasoned that regulation 46A and Table III of the Income Tax Regulations 1917 established different values for live-stock depending on the State or part of a State in which they were located. For example, the valuation of horses and cattle varied significantly between New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, and Tasmania. The Court held that this differential valuation, based solely on geographical location within different States, constituted discrimination between States. Applying the principle established in *R. v. Barger*, the Court found that such discrimination was expressly forbidden by section 51(II) of the Constitution, which mandates that Commonwealth taxation laws must not discriminate between States or parts of States. Consequently, the Court concluded that the regulations were invalid as they infringed this constitutional provision.

The High Court answered the first question posed by Ewing J. in the affirmative, finding that Statutory Rules 1918, No. 315, were beyond the legislative powers of the Commonwealth. The Court declined to answer the remaining questions, stating that the case as stated contained no statement of facts that would allow for their determination.