Cambridge; Chief Executive Officer, Services Australia and (Freedom of information)

This matter concerned an application for review of a decision by the Australian Information Commissioner (IC) regarding a freedom of information request. The applicant sought access to documents from Services Australia. The core of the dispute revolved around whether Services Australia could refuse the request on the grounds of a "practical refusal reason" under the *Freedom of Information Act 1982* (Cth).

The legal issues before the Tribunal were whether a practical refusal reason existed in relation to the applicant's request, and if so, whether Services Australia was justified in refusing access to the documents. Specifically, the Tribunal had to consider if the work involved in processing the request would substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of Services Australia from its other operations, as contemplated by section 24AA(1)(a)(i) of the Act.

The Tribunal noted that the majority of the documents sought by the applicant had already been provided to him under administrative access arrangements. The Tribunal reasoned that processing the FOI request for documents already provided would involve a substantial diversion of resources, estimated at 88.5 hours, which would be unreasonable given that the information was already accessible. The Tribunal applied the principles outlined in section 24AA of the *Freedom of Information Act 1982* (Cth), which permits an agency to refuse a request if processing it would substantially and unreasonably divert its resources.

The Tribunal set aside the IC's decision and substituted its own decision, finding that a practical refusal reason did exist and that Services Australia was entitled to refuse the request on this basis.