Cain v Malone

The case of *Cain v Malone* concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The plaintiff, an infant named Maisie Lisbeth Malone, brought an action for damages against the defendants, George James Cain and Eric Colin Eggins, trading as Modern Laundry, alleging negligence and breaches of the Factories and Shops Act 1912-1937 (N.S.W.) which resulted in severe injuries to her hand. The defendants pleaded, inter alia, that the plaintiff, as a worker, had received payments by way of compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1938 (N.S.W.) after the commencement of the Industrial Arbitration and Workers' Compensation (Amendment) Act 1938 (N.S.W.), and that these proceedings were not instituted within the six-month time limit prescribed by section 63 (3) (a) of the Workers' Compensation Act. The plaintiff's replication argued that as an infant, the receipt of compensation was not for her benefit, and therefore the time limitation did not apply.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the time limitation imposed by section 63 (3) (a) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1938 (N.S.W.) applied to an infant worker who had received compensation payments, even if those payments were not for the infant's benefit. This required the Court to consider whether the principle established in *Farmer & Co. Ltd. v Griffiths* (1940) 63 C.L.R. 603, which held that the receipt of compensation by an infant was only binding if it was for the infant's benefit, should be applied or overruled.

The High Court, by a majority, dismissed the appeal. The Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court, which had followed its own prior ruling in *Farrell v. Motor Body Repairing and Welding Pty. Ltd.* (1941) 58 W.N. (N.S.W.) 216, itself based on the principle in *Farmer & Co. Ltd. v Griffiths*. The majority of the High Court judges found no compelling reason to overrule *Farmer's Case*, considering it to be a correct application of established principles regarding the capacity of infants to be bound by transactions. They held that for section 63 (3) (a) to operate, it was necessary to show that the receipt of compensation was for the benefit of the infant, and that the mere de facto receipt of payments by an infant worker did not automatically bring the time limitation into effect if such receipt was not beneficial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.