2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 850 of 2009
BETWEEN:
LLEWELLYN FREDRICK BUULTJENS Applicant
AND:
STUART ROBERTSON Respondent
JUDGE:
MARSHALL J
DATE:
18 DECEMBER 2009
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant, Mr Buultjens, has commenced a proceeding in this Court seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent, Mr Robertson, to submit to the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship the applicant’s request for special ministerial intervention under s 351 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
The Minister had previously considered and rejected a request by the applicant that he intervene under s 351 of the Act to permit the applicant to remain in Australia.
The respondent has objected to the competency of the application. The application, he submits, is not within the jurisdiction of this Court due to the operation of s 476A of the Act. That section limits the Court’s jurisdiction in migration matters to those set out in s 476A(1); see Beyazkilinc v Manager, Baxter Immigration Reception & Processing Centre (2006) 155 FCR 465 at [51]–[52] per Besanko J. See also Raikua v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2007) 158 FCR 510 at [64] per Lindgren J.
As the decision sought to be challenged is not one referred to in s 476A(1) of the Act, the respondent’s objection to the competency of the application is made out. The proceeding is dismissed pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) as the Court is satisfied that the applicant has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding.
The order of the Court is that the application is dismissed with costs, to be taxed in default of agreement.
I certify that the preceding five (5) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Marshall.
Associate:
Dated: 18 December 2009
The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent:
Mr N Rogers
Solicitor for the Respondent:
Australian Government Solicitor
Date of Hearing:
18 December 2009
Date of Judgment:
18 December 2009
Details
AGLC
Buultjens v Robertson [2009] FCA 1537
Case
[2009] FCA 1537
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Buultjens v Robertson was an application in the Supreme Court of Queensland regarding a dispute between the applicant, Buultjens, and the respondent, Robertson. The central issue in the case was the enforcement of a financial settlement agreement reached between the parties during their divorce proceedings. The applicant sought to have the agreement enforced, claiming that the respondent had failed to comply with its terms.
The court was tasked with determining whether the financial settlement agreement was valid and enforceable and whether the respondent had indeed breached its terms. It had to consider the evidence provided by both parties and interpret the terms of the agreement in light of the relevant legal principles. The court also had to decide whether any procedural errors occurred during the original divorce proceedings that could potentially invalidate the agreement.
In reaching its decision, the court examined the evidence presented and the terms of the financial settlement agreement. It found that there was no evidence to support the applicant's claim that the respondent had failed to comply with the agreement. The court also noted that the agreement had been reached through negotiations between the parties and had been approved by the Family Court. It concluded that the agreement was valid and enforceable and that the applicant's application should be dismissed. The court further found that the applicant was to bear the costs of the proceedings, to be taxed if the parties could not agree on the amount.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, to be taxed in default of agreement.