Bruhn v Australian Steamships Pty Ltd

The appellant, Ernest Bruhn, a seaman, appealed to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. Bruhn had sustained an injury in the service of the respondent's ship, the *Chronos*, while it was in the Port of Melbourne. He was subsequently discharged from the ship and paid wages up to that date, with his maintenance and medical expenses covered by the respondent. Bruhn contended that he was entitled to wages under section 132 of the *Navigation Act 1912-1920* for the period from his discharge until his arrival at his home port, Port Adelaide.

The central legal issue before the High Court was the interpretation of section 132(1)(b) of the *Navigation Act 1912-1920*, specifically the period for which a seaman, incapacitated by an accident in the service of the ship and landed at a port other than his home port, is entitled to receive wages. The Supreme Court of Victoria had held that the phrase "after his recovery" qualified both the entitlement to a free passage and the entitlement to wages, meaning wages were only payable from the date of recovery.

The High Court, in allowing the appeal, reasoned that the phrase "after his recovery" in section 132(1)(b) primarily qualified the entitlement to a free passage, postponing its availability until the seaman was cured. It did not limit the commencement of the wages period. The Court found that the landing of the seaman at the specified port was the intended commencement of the period for which wages were payable, consistent with the wording in paragraph (a) and the implication of the proviso referring to the "date he was left on shore." The Court concluded that the wages were payable from the date the seaman was left on shore until his arrival at his home port, subject to the conditions in the proviso.