Brown v Director-General of the Justice and Community Safety Directorate

The Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, constituted by McCallum CJ, Mossop and Wheelahan JJ, heard an appeal concerning the alleged failure of the Director-General of the Justice and Community Safety Directorate to provide an Aboriginal Health Assessment to the appellant while she was detained at the Alexander Maconochie Centre. The appellant contended that the Director-General was obligated under the *Corrections Management Act 2007* (ACT) and the *Human Rights Act 2004* (ACT) to ensure such an assessment was provided.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the *Corrections Management Act 2007* (ACT), specifically section 53, imposed a positive obligation on the Director-General to ensure an Aboriginal Health Assessment was provided to detainees, and whether this obligation extended to providing an assessment equivalent to those available in the community. Additionally, the Court considered whether the Director-General's alleged failure to ensure such an assessment breached the appellant's rights under sections 19 (humane treatment when deprived of liberty) and 27 (cultural rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples) of the *Human Rights Act 2004* (ACT).

The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the primary judge's decision. The reasoning focused on the interpretation of section 53 of the *Corrections Management Act 2007* (ACT), which requires the Director-General to ensure detainees have a standard of health care equivalent to that available in the community and that appropriate health services are arranged. The Court found that the appellant had not requested an Aboriginal Health Assessment during her detention, nor had she alleged any adverse outcome arising from its absence. Furthermore, the Court noted that medical care within the prison was provided by Justice Health or a contracted service, not directly by the Director-General, and that the performance of an Aboriginal Health Assessment would not necessarily have led to any health intervention that did not otherwise occur. The Court also considered that a broad interpretation of section 53, as contended by the appellant, could represent an unusual statutory incursion into the doctor-patient relationship and patient autonomy.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.