Brisbane Airport Corporation Limited ACN 076 870 650 v Wright

Case [2002] FCA 370


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Brisbane Airport Corporation Limited ACN 076 870 650 v Wright
[2002] FCA 370

BRISBANE AIRPORT CORPORATION LIMITED, ACN 076 870 650 v DEPUTY PRESIDENT C R WRIGHT AS A PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL, KEVIN RUDD and MINISTER FOR TRANSPORT AND REGIONAL SERVICES

Q 198 OF 2001

DOWSETT J
28 MARCH 2002
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 198 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

BRISBANE AIRPORT CORPORATION LIMITED,
ACN 076 870 650
APPLICANT

AND:

DEPUTY PRESIDENT C R WRIGHT
AS A PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
FIRST RESPONDENT

KEVIN RUDD
SECOND RESPONDENT

MINISTER FOR TRANSPORT AND REGIONAL SERVICES
THIRD RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DOWSETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 MARCH 2002

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The second respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings, including reserved costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 198 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

BRISBANE AIRPORT CORPORATION LIMITED,
ACN 076 870 650
APPLICANT

AND:

DEPUTY PRESIDENT C R WRIGHT AS A PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
FIRST RESPONDENT

KEVIN RUDD
SECOND RESPONDENT

MINISTER FOR TRANSPORT AND REGIONAL SERVICES
THIRD RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DOWSETT J

DATE:

28 MARCH 2002

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The second respondent, having been unsuccessful in these proceedings, it would normally follow that he ought pay the costs of them.  However he submits that for a number of reasons, that should not be the case.  Firstly, he submits that his claim is brought on behalf of the community and seeks to uphold a community interest.  In a broad factual sense that may be correct.  However parties who seek to represent such broad interests must be aware that they expose themselves to the risk of costs.  It would be unfair to other parties to the litigation to allow some general exception in a case of that kind.

  2. In any event, the process for developing a master plan of the sort with which I have been concerned here, involves a substantial amount of input, including input from relevant local authorities.  There seems to me to be no reason to believe that they will not, to the extent appropriate for a project of this kind, represent the interests of affected residents.  It is also said that the informal nature of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal proceedings is inconsistent with the parties being exposed to orders for costs in review proceedings.  The AAT process may be informal, but it must proceed in accordance with law.  It is the failure to so proceed which attracts judicial review.

  3. The second respondent points out that in the AAT, proceedings were conducted in accordance with the decision in Allan.  It is true that the approach adopted by the High Court in that case differed substantially from that adopted in the Full Court.  The High Court's judgment was not available until after the decision in the AAT had been delivered.  Nonetheless, as between the parties the merits or otherwise arising from that fact are equal.  It is not a basis for visiting the consequences upon the applicant rather than the second respondent.

  4. Finally, it is said that the resources of the applicant are substantial, whilst the second respondent is merely a private person.  That is no doubt true, but there is no general principle or compelling reason of policy which should lead the Court to favour one litigant against another based upon financial resources.  In many cases that would do nothing more than invite an otherwise irrelevant investigation of the assets of those who come before us.

  5. In the circumstances I see no reason why the usual order should not be made.  I will order that the second respondent pay the applicant's costs of the proceedings including reserved costs. 

I certify that the preceding five (5) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Dowsett.

Associate:

Dated:             21 June 2002

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Mallesons Stephen Jaques

The Second Respondent appeared In Person.

Date of Hearing:

28 March 2002

Date of Judgment:

28 March 2002

Details
AGLC
Brisbane Airport Corporation Limited ACN 076 870 650 v Wright [2002] FCA 370
Case
[2002] FCA 370
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Brisbane Airport Corporation Limited (BAC) brought an application for interlocutory injunction against Wright to restrain him from entering into and onto the BAC’s property, the Brisbane Airport, for a period of five years. The court was asked to grant the injunction on the basis that Wright had engaged in repeated acts of trespass on the property, and had caused damage to property and disrupted airport operations. Wright opposed the application on the basis that it was an abuse of process and that BAC had failed to consider other options, such as installing security measures, to prevent trespass.

The court considered the factors relevant to the grant of an interlocutory injunction, including the strength of the applicant’s case, the balance of convenience and the irreparable harm that may be suffered if the injunction is not granted. The court found that the applicant had made out a prima facie case for the grant of the injunction and that the balance of convenience favoured the grant of the injunction. The court also found that the applicant had not unreasonably refused to negotiate with the respondent and had considered other options to prevent trespass.

The court granted the application for an interlocutory injunction, restraining Wright from entering into and onto the BAC’s property for a period of five years. The court also ordered that Wright pay BAC’s costs of the proceedings, including reserved costs. The court found that Wright’s conduct warranted the grant of the injunction, and that the injunction was necessary to protect the safety and security of the airport and its operations. The court also found that the injunction was proportionate to the harm suffered by the applicant and that it would not cause undue hardship to the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The second respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings, including reserved costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

DOWSETT J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOWSETT J

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