Break Fast Investments Pty Ltd v PCH Melbourne Pty Ltd

The case of Break Fast Investments Pty Ltd v PCH Melbourne Pty Ltd involved a dispute over an encroachment into airspace caused by cladding installed by PCH on a building they owned. The lower court had issued a mandatory injunction requiring PCH to remove the cladding, and PCH appealed this decision. The appeal was heard in the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The central issue before the court was whether the mandatory injunction should be replaced with an order for PCH to pay damages to Break Fast instead of removing the cladding. This involved determining if the encroachment was merely trivial or trifling and assessing the appropriateness of damages as an alternative to the injunction. The court also considered the application of the 'good working rule' exception, which may allow for minor encroachments to be tolerated if they do not significantly affect the use or enjoyment of the land.

The court examined whether the encroachment constituted a trifling or trivial invasion of airspace, which might make an injunction oppressive and damages a more suitable remedy. It also weighed the potential detriment to Break Fast if an injunction were not granted, against the oppression an injunction would cause to PCH. The court cited precedents such as Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co and Jaggard v Sawyer to assist in its analysis. Ultimately, the court found that the mandatory injunction should stand, rejecting PCH's arguments that the encroachment was trifling and that damages would be a sufficient remedy. The court concluded that the oppression caused to PCH in removing the cladding was not sufficient to warrant replacing the injunction with damages, and that the detriment to Break Fast in not having the cladding removed outweighed any potential oppression to PCH.

The court held that the lower court's decision to grant a mandatory injunction was correct. It dismissed the appeal and upheld the original decision, affirming that the mandatory injunction requiring PCH to remove the cladding remained in place. The court's reasoning was grounded in the principles that an encroachment into airspace, even if minor, can still be significant enough to warrant an injunction if it affects the use or enjoyment of the land, and that the detriment to the plaintiff in not receiving an injunction generally outweighs the potential oppression to the defendant. The final orders of the court were that the appeal by PCH was dismissed, and the mandatory injunction requiring the removal of the cladding remained in effect.