Bradley and Secretary, Department of Education, Skills and Employment

The applicant, Mr Bradley, sought an extension of time to lodge an application for review of a decision made by the University on 29 June 2020, which refused to re-credit his HECS-HELP balance for certain units of study. This decision followed an earlier application made by Mr Bradley on 14 February 2020, seeking remission of fees due to special circumstances, which the University had refused on 28 February 2020. The substantive matter concerned the review of the University's 2020 decision, and the interlocutory proceedings before the Tribunal concerned Mr Bradley's application for an extension of time to lodge this substantive review application, pursuant to subsection 29(7) of the *Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975* (Cth). The respondent, the Secretary of the Department of Education, Skills and Employment, opposed the extension of time.

The Tribunal was required to determine whether it was reasonable in all the circumstances to grant an extension of time for Mr Bradley to lodge his application for review. In considering this, the Tribunal was guided by established principles for exercising the discretion to extend time, which include assessing the applicant's explanation for the delay, whether the applicant had "rested on his rights," any prejudice to the respondent, the merits of the substantive application, and considerations of fairness to other persons in similar positions. The Tribunal noted that these principles are not to be applied mechanically and that the overriding consideration is the reasonableness of granting the extension in all the circumstances.

The Tribunal applied these principles, noting that the application for review was lodged on 15 October 2021, almost 14 years after the relevant study periods concluded and over 16 months after the University's 2020 Review Decision. The Tribunal found that there was no acceptable explanation for the significant delay. Furthermore, the Tribunal considered that the applicant had effectively "rested on his rights" for a considerable period, and that granting an extension would likely cause prejudice to the respondent. The merits of the substantive application were also considered, but were not sufficient to outweigh the other factors.

The Tribunal concluded that it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to grant an extension of time. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time was refused.