Booth v An Assessor under Section 24 of the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2006 (NT) (No 2)

[2020] NTCA 7

CITATION: Booth v An Assessor under Section 24 of the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2006 (NT) & Anor (No 2) [2020] NTCA 7

PARTIES:BOOTH, James Congalton

v

AN ASSESSOR UNDER SECTION 24 OF THE VICTIMS OF CRIME ASSISTANCE ACT 2006 (NT)

and

DIRECTOR, CRIMES VICTIMS SERVICES UNIT

TITLE OF COURT:  COURT OF APPEAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  CIVIL APPEAL from the SUPREME COURT exercising Territory jurisdiction

FILE NO:AP 2 of 2020 (21931892)

DELIVERED:  16 April 2020

HEARING DATE:  On the papers

JUDGMENT OF:  Graham AJ

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
          Appellant:  Self-represented
          Respondents:  L Peattie

Solicitors:

Appellant:Self-represented

Respondents:  Solicitor for the Northern Territory

Judgment category classification:          C
Judgment ID Number:  Grah2002
Number of pages:  3

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

Booth v An Assessor under Section 24 of the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2006 (NT) & Anor (No 2) [2020] NTCA 7
AP 2 of 2020 (21931892)

BETWEEN:

JAMES CONGALTON BOOTH

Appellant

AND:

AN ASSESSOR UNDER SECTION 24 OF THE VICTIMS OF CRIME ASSISTANCE ACT 2006 (NT)

First Respondent

AND:

DIRECTOR, CRIMES VICTIMS SERVICES UNIT
  Second Respondent

CORAM:           GRAHAM AJ

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 16 April 2020)

1. On 30 March 2020, sitting as the Court of Appeal, I refused the appellant leave to appeal from a decision of the Chief Justice dated 27 December 2019.

2. I did not make a decision as to costs in my judgment but gave the parties an opportunity to make submissions, in writing, as to costs.

3. The respondents who were successful seek a gross costs order of $4,755. Alternatively, the respondents seek an order for taxed costs. The application for costs is opposed by the appellant. The application is determined on the papers. I refer to the lodged documentation hereunder.

4. The respondents have filed submissions arguing that as they were the successful parties, an order for costs in their favour should be made. The respondents further argue that costs should be awarded on an indemnity basis because the appeal was brought by the appellant without any prospects of success and was incompetent.

5. The submissions were accompanied by an affidavit from Ms Cramp, a legal practitioner employed by the Solicitor for the Northern Territory. Ms Cramp has set out in her affidavit how the sum of $4,755 is arrived at and she deposes that her estimate of costs is conservative.

6. The appellant sent two emails to the court on 8 and 9 April 2020. They were lengthy missives that related to a variety of subjects. Within the documents, as best as I can determine, the appellant argues against an order for costs on the grounds of impecuniosity and lack of knowledge of the law. He also, I note, has made a number of grandiose and outrageous complaints about the Northern Territory Legal Aid Commission, the Attorney General’s Department and the Supreme Court. I will disregard these fulminations as they are not germane to the application for costs. I will also ignore some florid and specious criticisms he has made of the proceedings heard by me. His complaints and aspersions also have no bearing on the application for costs.

7. I concluded in my decision as to the merits that the application of the appellant was frivolous. The appellant has failed to provide a cogent reason why a costs order should not be made. The most significant factor in this application for costs is the incompetence of the appeal. If a litigant seeks to appeal a Supreme Court judgment that litigant bears an obligation to, at the very least, attempt to comply with the Rules of Court. I am also of the view that this is a case where an order for indemnity costs should be made. The appellant has failed to engage with the appeal that he has sought to lodge.  Instead he has embarked on an exercise in self-indulgence, as evidenced by his emails. In these circumstances I conclude that not only should he be ordered to pay costs, but indemnity costs.

8. The question then arises as to whether the sum claimed is appropriate or whether I simply order that costs be taxed. I conclude that the affidavit of Ms Cramp should be accepted and that it is expedient and sensible to order a lump sum for costs rather than have the matter taxed.

9. I order that the appellant pay the respondents’ costs fixed at $4,755.

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